TEHRAN — The United States’ ongoing military campaign against Iran is increasingly raising questions about whether Washington can avoid becoming trapped in another prolonged conflict, as the experience of the 20-year war in Afghanistan offers a cautionary example of how difficult it can be for successive US administrations to end wars once they have begun.

The New York Times examined this issue in an article.

The Afghanistan war formally ended five years ago with the chaotic withdrawal of US forces from Kabul. The departure followed two decades of fighting and culminated in scenes of thousands of Afghans crowding Kabul airport to flee the Taliban. A suicide bombing during the evacuation killed 13 US service members.

Yet many of the fears that had persuaded successive US presidents to maintain the war ultimately failed to materialize. Afghanistan did not become the launchpad for a major new wave of attacks against the United States after the withdrawal.

The parallel with Iran is now becoming increasingly relevant as Washington faces the challenge of determining how to end its latest military confrontation without allowing it to evolve into another open-ended war.

US officials initially portrayed the campaign against Iran as limited and decisive. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said earlier this year that the conflict would bear little resemblance to the prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, describing the operation as focused, swift, and intended to produce a decisive outcome.

The course of the conflict, however, has complicated that assessment.

Iran responded to US attacks by closing the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints. The disruption has presented Washington with a military and economic challenge extending beyond the immediate battlefield.

Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has acknowledged that air power alone may not be sufficient to defeat Iran or restore normal commercial traffic through the strait. His assessment underscored a fundamental limitation facing Washington: military strikes can impose substantial damage but translating that damage into a political outcome may require a much broader and more costly commitment.

The United States has subsequently placed greater emphasis on naval pressure, including a blockade of Iranian exports through the strait, alongside economic sanctions. While there have been indications of increased maritime traffic and oil shipments, US officials have increasingly discussed the possibility of a campaign lasting months or longer rather than a rapid victory.

That shift has revived questions that haunted the Afghanistan war: how long can Washington sustain a military campaign when its objectives remain difficult to define, and the costs of escalation continue to rise?

Afghanistan demonstrated how concerns over credibility, commitments to allies and the sacrifices of troops can make withdrawal politically and institutionally difficult. Military leaders who had spent years fighting were often reluctant to acknowledge that the strategic objectives had become unattainable.

Iran presents a different strategic equation. Unlike Afghanistan, it possesses substantial military capabilities, a large population, significant economic resources, and a highly developed network of regional relationships. Its leaders also have strong incentives to resist pressure they view as an existential threat.

At the same time, the stakes for Washington may be considerably lower than they were in Afghanistan, raising the question of whether the United States has more to lose by prolonging the conflict than by pursuing a negotiated exit.

Reopening the Strait of Hormuz may be militarily possible, but doing so could require significant resources and expose US forces to additional risks. The longer such an operation continues, the greater the possibility that a campaign initially presented as limited could develop into a sustained confrontation.

The Afghanistan experience therefore offers a broader warning for policymakers dealing with Iran: ending a war can become increasingly difficult once military objectives, political credibility and the sacrifices of deployed forces become intertwined.

Five years after the fall of Kabul, the central lesson may be less about how the United States wins wars than about how difficult it can be to recognize when continuing one no longer serves its interests.